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‘The door creaked shut’: The ramifications of the new breach of bail offence in the 
Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) 
In trooped the children behind the pied piper, and when the last child had gone into the darkness, the door 
creaked shut.1 
Abstract 
As part of the 2014 amendments to the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) the previous Queensland 
government introduced a new breach of bail offence and a reverse onus provision in relation 
to the new offence. Also included in the raft of amendments was a provision removing the 
internationally accepted principle that, in relation to young offenders, detention should be 
used as ‘a last resort’. This article argues that these changes are likely to increase the 
entrenchment of young people within the criminal justice system. 
Introduction 
In 2014 the conservative Liberal National Party government made a number of amendments 
to the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (YJA). Of critical importance is the new breach of bail 
offence (s 59A) and the reverse onus provision (s 59B). The effect of these changes was 
compounded by the removal of the sentencing principle of ‘detention as a last resort’ 
(s150(5)).  Cumulatively, these three amendments increase the likelihood of entrenching 
young people within the criminal justice system. Previously where a young person committed 
an offence whilst on bail, it has been treated ‘as an aggravating circumstance on the sentence 
for that offence’.2 Under the amendments, a child who is found guilty of a ‘subsequent 
offence’ (defined in s59AA) committed while on bail, now faces two additional penalties, 
those being the sentence for the new or ‘subsequent offence’ and in addition a separate 
charge (and sentence) for breaching bail(s59(2)). The maximum penalty for the breach of bail 
offence is 20 penalty units or 1 year’s imprisonment. 
Reports of persistent or repeat offenders provided the rhetorical backdrop and policy 
justification for enacting the new laws. Australian Bureau of Statistics figures demonstrate 
that the number of youth offenders (10-19 year olds) in Queensland decreased in 2012-13.3 
When introducing the amendments, the Attorney General acknowledged that the offending 
rates for young people overall were falling in Queensland.4 However, the Children’s Court of 
Queensland Annual Report for 2011-2012 had noted that ‘the statistics seem to demonstrate 
that there are a number of persistent offenders who are charged with multiple offences’.5 The 
new provisions were aimed at selectively incapacitating ‘repeat offenders’.6 But the new bail 
provisions have the capacity, due to their lack of appropriate restrictions, to apply to repeat 
offenders and first time offenders alike.  
 
                                                            
1 Tales from the Brothers Grimm: The Pied Piper of Hamlyn 
http://www.yankeeweb.com/library/storytime/grimmbros/grimmbros_0.html#grimmbros_41 
2 Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Qld) Childrens Court Annual Report 2013-2014 (2014), 7. 
3 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Recorded Crime- Offenders 2012-2013 Queensland (24 March 2014) 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4519.0main+features282012-13. In Queensland children are those under 
the age of 17, not 18. 
4 Queensland, First Reading Speech: Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Bill (2014), 11 February 2014 
(Honourable Jarrod Bleijie). 
5 Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Qld) Childrens Court of Queensland Annual Report 2011 – 2012 (2013), 6. 
6 First Reading Speech: Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, above n 4. 
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Removal of detention as a last resort 
Detention is the most punitive sentencing option under the criminal law in Queensland. 
Detention is now being placed on the agenda as a sentencing option at an earlier stage. 
Through the enactment of s 150(5) YJA, the 2014 amendments exclude the sentencing 
principle of ‘detention as a last resort’, a principle enshrined in human rights conventions and 
treaties. 7 Section 150(5) YJA states that ‘this section overrides any other Act or law to the 
extent that, in sentencing a child for an offence, the court must not have regard to any 
principle that a detention order should be imposed only as a last resort’. Removing the 
sentencing principle allows the ‘Children’s Court to…impose a sentence of detention even 
though a less restrictive sentence may also have been appropriate in the circumstances’.8 It is 
pertinent to recall here that at least one successful diversionary option, court referred youth 
justice conferencing, had already been removed in 2012.9 
Queensland is now the only jurisdiction in Australia which has removed the sentencing 
principle of ‘detention as a last resort’ for all categories of young offenders.10 The removal of 
the principle is at variance with the Charter of Youth Justice Principles (Schedule 1) to which 
the court must have regard according to the Sentencing Principles in s 150(1)(b). Section 5 of 
the Charter reads ‘If a child commits an offence, the child should be treated in a way that 
diverts the child from the courts' criminal justice system, unless the nature of the offence and 
the child's criminal history indicate that a proceeding for the offence should be started.’ The 
Special Considerations in s 150(2)(b) also acknowledge that (b) ‘a non-custodial order is 
better than detention in promoting a child’s ability to reintegrate into the community’. This 
situation is compounded by the fact that other recent amendments to the YJA require young 
people to be automatically transferred to adult prisons on their seventeenth birthday if they 
have six months or more still to serve on their sentence.11 It is in the community’s interest 
that the principle be restored.   
Section 59A: The new breach of bail offence 
Despite the court’s existing powers to impose conditions, an additional breach of bail offence 
has been introduced in Queensland. The role of bail is to preserve the presumption of 
innocence and ensure the accused will attend court to defend themselves against a charge.12 
When bail is granted the court decides whether there will be any conditions attached to the 
bail and in some instances breach of such conditions by the accused is an offence.13   
Section 59A YJA now makes it an offence for a child to be found guilty of  a subsequent 
offence whilst on bail for the original offence. The offender will now be facing (1) a penalty 
for the offence which constitutes the breach and (2) a penalty for the offence of the breach 
itself.  This compounding of penalties  for essentially the same acts or omissions has the 
                                                            
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 [1980] ATS 23 Art 9; Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, opened for signature 20th November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S 3 (entered into force in Australia 16 January 1991) Art 1, 
Art 12, Art 19, Art 37. 
8 Explanatory Notes, Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld). 
9 Youth Justice (Boot Camp Orders) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Qld) ss 2, 21. 
10 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 133G(2); Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s33(2); Children, 
Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) ss 360(1), 361; Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) s 80; Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 
23(4);(Note: It is recognised in relation to all but serious offenders within the South Australian legislation). 
11 See Division 2A Period of Detention to be served as Period of Imprisonment Youth Justice Act 1992 
12 Richard Edney, ‘Bail Conditions as a mitigating factor in sentencing’ (2007) 31 Criminal Law Journal 101, 101. 
13 Bail Act 1992 (ACT) s 49; Bail Act 2013 (NSW) s 79; Bail Act (NT) s 37B; Bail Act 1980 (Qld) ss 29, 33, 33A; Bail Act 
1985 (SA) s 17; Bail Act 1994 (Tas) s 9; Bail Act 1977 (Vic) ss 30, 30A; Bail Act 1982 (WA) s 51. 
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propensity to inflate the critical mass of offences on a child’s criminal record. Decades of 
research tell us that defining a child as an offender and adding to their criminal history is 
(itself) one of the key criminogenic factors of recidivism.14  
Section 59A lacks specificity and may be applied to children who commit minor or one-off 
offences. The provision does not state clearly whether breaching a bail condition (that would 
not be an offence but for the child being on bail) will invoke application of the new offence. 
Section 59A requires that a child merely be ‘charged’ for an original offence and then 
‘convicted’ of a ‘subsequent’ offence. Therefore the s 59A provision increases the scope of 
its application and can create a net-widening effect by: 
 Not specifying that s 59A applies to a defined group of ‘repeat offenders’, 
 Not defining the nature and seriousness of the ‘subsequent offence’ within the 
provision, 
 Requiring that a child merely be ‘charged’ rather than convicted of the  original 
offence, and 
 Not providing a defense for the offence. 
 
The breach of bail offence applying to adults in Queensland is less onerous than the breach of 
bail offence under the YJA. The Bail Act 1980 (Qld) s 29 states that a ‘defendant must not 
break any condition of the undertaking on which the defendant was granted bail requiring the 
defendant’s appearance before a court’. . Accordingly, the breach of bail offence is restricted 
to the breaking of a bail condition by the defendant in relation to the requirement of the 
defendant’s appearance before a court and a defence of ‘reasonable cause’ is provided to 
adult defendants under s 33. Section 29(2)(a) states that the breach of bail offence ‘does not 
apply to a defendant who is a child’.  
The only other state that has a similar arrangement with mention of a breach of bail offence 
within their youth legislation is Tasmania, however, the provision includes a defence of 
reasonable cause under Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) s 24C. The NT and WA breach of bail 
provisions provide the accused with the defence of ‘reasonable excuse’15 and ‘reasonable 
cause’16 respectively. Breach of bail provisions in Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory 
and Tasmania provide the accused with a defence for breaching bail,17 whilst other 
jurisdictions ensure the penalty imposed under a breach of bail provision does not exceed the 
penalty for the original offence.18  Presently, the s 59A offence has the ability to apply a 
penalty of up to 1 year’s imprisonment without ensuring that the penalty imposed is less than 
that of the original offence. Instead of providing a defence for a child faced with an s 59A 
offence, s 59B includes a reverse onus provision so that the child must prove that they are 
innocent of the breach. 
Section 59B: The reverse onus 
Section 59B states that ‘a copy of the bail order issued by the court or a copy of the child’s 
undertaking for the original offence’ is ‘sufficient proof that the child was on bail for the 
original offence’. The onus is then placed on the child to prove ‘why the child should not be 
convicted of an offence under s 59A’. Initially, it may be argued that section 59B works to 
                                                            
14 Uberto Gatti, Richard E Tremblay and Frank Vitam, ‘Iatrogenic Effect of Juvenile Justice’ (2009) 50 Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry 991. 
15 Bail Act (1982) (NT) s 37B. 
16 Bail Act 1982 (WA) s 51. 
17 Bail Act 1992 (ACT) s 49; Bail Act 2013 (NSW) s 79(1); Bail Act 1985 (SA) s17(1); Bail Act 1994 (Tas) s 9; Bail Act 
1977 (Vic) ss 30A, 30B, 30(1). 
18 Bail Act 2013 (NSW) s 79(3); Bail Act 1985 (SA) s17(2).  
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ensure that s 59A is a presumptive sentence. Presumptive and mandatory sentences fall under 
a generic category called ‘fixed penalties’ and a ‘presumptive sentence’ refers to the 
imposition of a fixed penalty unless the accused demonstrates a reason not to do so.19 Section 
59A and s 59B in tandem create a mandatory sentencing effect under the guise of a 
presumptive sentencing provision. This is substantiated by the s 59B reverse onus provision. 
The criminal law rests upon the principle that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove an 
accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.20 However, this long standing principle does not 
apply to the s 59B reverse onus provision given that it is a statutory exception to the 
principle. Consequently, s 59B provision makes it easier for the prosecution to prove the 
child is guilty of the s 59A offence.21 The onus is on the accused child to prove their 
innocence against the enormous power and resources of the state. Due to this onus, it may be 
argued that s 59B is based upon the presumption that a child is a repeat offender. The 
apparent presumption of guilt under s 59B together with the unlikelihood that a child has 
briefed legal representation present in court makes it almost certain the child will be found 
guilty of the s 59A offence. Consequently, the child becomes subject to a possible one year 
imprisonment before determination of the alleged original offence by the court. Even if a 
child raises a reasonable doubt, that child remains caught under the presumption of guilt 
because ‘under the reverse onus clause nothing less than proof to the contrary will do’, and if 
a child does not meet the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities the reverse onus 
provision acts as a ‘legislative direction to convict on proof of the basic fact alone’. 22   
Twenty years ago, Karen Freeman concluded that the majority of children who come into 
contact with the juvenile justice system are one-off offenders. 23 More recently, researchers 
have challenged the ‘dogma’ that young people grow out of crime as a ‘fallacy’.24 However, 
closer inspection reveals that ‘for nearly half (42 percent) of young people who have formal 
contact with the criminal justice system, offending is transient’ which means that the ‘dogma’ 
is true – both in terms of those who offend but are not picked up by the system, and in terms 
of those who have formal contact with the criminal justice system. 25  Kelly Richards has also 
argued that contact with the courts ‘increases the chance of a return visit so that children can 
be caught up in the criminal justice system and so increase the risk of detention’.26 
Therefore it may be argued that s 59A is a mandatory offence placed on a child for merely 
coming into contact with the juvenile justice system since the provision has no regard to the 
nature, severity and number of alleged offences committed by a child. The NT and WA 
mandatory sentencing laws apply to property offences only, whereas s 59A of the YJA has 
the ability to apply to a broader spectrum of offences with differing degrees of criminal 
culpability. 
 
Recommendations to Ameliorate the Effects of the Youth Justice Act Amendments 
                                                            
19 Neil Morgan, ‘Why We Should Not Have Mandatory Penalties: Theoretical Structures and Political Realities’ (2002) 23 
Adelaide Law Review 141, 145. 
20 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462 [481-482]. 
21 K Dawkins, ‘Statutory Presumptions and Reverse Onus Clauses in the Criminal Law: In Search of Rationality’ (1987) 3 
Canterbury Law Review 214, 215.  
22 Ibid 216. 
23 Karen Freeman, ‘Young People and Crime’ (1996) 32 Crime and Justice Bulletin 2, 5, 7. 
24 Don Weatherburn, Andrew McGrath and Lorana Bartels ‘Three dogmas of juvenile justice’ (2012) 35(3) UNSW Law 
Journal 779. 
25 Kelly Richards and Murray Lee, ‘Beyond the ‘three dogmas of juvenile justice’: A Response to Weatherburn, McGrath 
and Bartels’ (2013) 36(3) UNSW Law Journal 839, 849. 
26 Richards Ibid 841; Uberto Gatti, Richard E Tremblay and Frank Vitam, ‘Iatrogenic Effect of Juvenile Justice’ (2009) 50 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 991. 
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The following recommendations are proposed in order to ameliorate the effects of the recent 
amendments.  
(a) Ensure section 59A is specific in its application 
The High Court has held that ‘a sentence should not be increased beyond what is 
proportionate to the crime’.27 However, s 59A has the ability to apply to children who are not 
recidivists and children with differing degrees of criminal culpability. The NT and WA 
mandatory laws are less restrictive in approach. If the intention behind the amendments was 
to target recidivists or repeat offenders then this should be included in s 59A. Section 59A 
should also define an ‘offence’ to prevent children being subject to imprisonment and 
additional offences on their criminal record for actions that would not previously constitute  
breach of bail. 
 (b) Remove s 59B reverse onus provision and provide a defence of reasonable excuse 
Section 59B implies a presumption of guilt in place of the common law rule of the 
presumption of innocence due to the reverse onus requirement. Section 59B(3) may not 
provide an accused child with sufficient time to create a defence or seek legal counsel. 
Section 59B should include a defence for the child of reasonable excuse and ensure that the 
breach of bail penalty does not exceed the penalty for the original offence. 
 (c) Reinstate the ‘Last Resort’ Principle 
Arguably, the removal of the ‘last resort’ principle is creating a more punitive culture within 
the police and justice sector so that remand is being used as a first resort. This change is 
evident in the number of children being held on remand rather than being granted bail. In the 
period to June 2012, there was an increase in the number of unsentenced children in 
detention.28  The detention centres are overcrowded, and many of those children are on 
remand.29  
(d) Avoid preventive detention 
Section 59A and s 59B can result in a form of preventative detention because of the removal 
of the principle of ‘detention as a last resort’. The stigma created by sensationalism30 may 
subject a child to preventative detention based on their youth rather than being detained for 
committing a serious offence. This would breach the rule against preventive detention 
declared by the High Court in Kable v DPP.31 Kable involved imprisoning a person based on 
their ‘potential’ to offend rather than determination of the person’s guilt.32 Arguably, s 59A 
punishes a child based on the child’s contact with the juvenile justice system and therefore 
their ‘potential’ to commit crime. 
(e) Ensure effective policies are in place to eradicate the causes of re-offending  
                                                            
27 Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 77 ALR 385 [390]. 
28 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Juvenile Justice Series no 13: Youth Detention Population in Australia 2013 
(2013) 2, 36, vii.  
29 Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Qld), Youth Detention Centre Demand Management Strategy 2013-2023, 
Consultation Draft, September 2014, 4, 9. http://www.scribd.com/doc/240007412/Draft-Youth-Detention-Centre-Demand-
Management-Strategy. 
30 Lyn Hinds, ‘Three strikes and you’re out in the west: A study of newspaper coverage of crime control in Western 
Australia’ (2005) 17(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 239, 240-241. 
31 (1996) 138 ALR 577. 
32 Patrick Keyzer and Sam Blay, ‘Double Punishment? Preventive Detention Schemes Under Australian Legislation and 




Unemployment, limited education, limited family support, mental health problems and drug 
use are all risk factors associated with recidivism.33 Governments contribute to crime by 
failing to address issues such as poverty, dysfunctional family environments, child 
maltreatment, and alcohol and drug abuse.34 Research has established a strong causal 
relationship between children (including adolescents) who suffer maltreatment and juvenile 
offending, so that  although ‘a number of risk factors have been identified as increasing the 
likelihood of offending, none are as consistent as the detrimental effect of child abuse and 
neglect’. 35 The President of the Childrens Court of Queensland, His Honour Judge Michael 
Shanahan notes in court’s latest Annual Report that ‘Over 75% of children in the youth 
justice system are known to the child protection systems. Around 50% of juvenile offenders 
have an intellectual disorder’ and ‘55% of young offenders of compulsory school age are 
either completely disengaged from school or attending irregularly (less than one day per 
week’.36 The previous conservative government was adamant that strategies to balance 
inequities arising from the amendments they were introducing would be addressed in funded 
interventions and programs for at-risk children - a Blueprint for the Future of Youth Justice in 
Queensland.37 The Blueprint was never released. Such strategies need to be firmly based on 
the plethora of social evidence available. If these amendments are to remain on the books 
then a draft of the proposed strategies needs to be released for public scrutiny immediately.  
 (f) Evaluate the effects on Indigenous Children 
Young people comprise 57 % of the Indigenous population,38 and approximately 66% of 
juvenile offenders in detention are Indigenous.39 Research suggests that indigenous children 
who have suffered maltreatment are ‘four times more likely to offend than non-Indigenous 
children’.40 In addition there is a higher rate of recorded repeat offending among Indigenous 
people than their nonindigenous counterparts.41 Therefore young Indigenous Australians are 
likely to be disproportionately affected by the new amendments. Early evaluation of the 
effects of more punitive legislation and court responses on young Indigenous people is 
crucial. Strategies should be set in place to ensure that this group of young people is not more 
disadvantaged than other children by these processes. 
Conclusion 
These legislative amendments in Queensland will increase  the entrenchment of young people 
within the criminal justice system. Section 59A YJA has a net widening effect due to its 
ambiguity. The breach of bail offence contains a reverse onus provision which is very 
onerous in the circumstances. In addition, the provisions have the capacity to apply more 
                                                            
33 Australia, Australian Institute of Criminology, Recidivism in Australia: findings and future research - Research and 
Policy Series No 80 (Jason Payne), 2007, 97. 
34 Hayley Bennett and GA Broe, ‘Brains, biology and socio-economic disadvantage in sentencing: Implications for the 
politics of moral culpability’ (2008) 32 Criminal Law Journal 167.  
35 Australian Institute of Criminology, Pathways from Child Maltreatment to Juvenile Offending-Research and Policy Series 
No 241 (Anna Stewart, Susan Dennison and Elissa Waterson), 2002, 1; Anna Stewart, Michael Livingston, and Susan 
Dennison, Submission No 1 to Child Abuse and Neglect, Transition and Turning Points: Examining the Links between Child 
Maltreatment and Juvenile Offending, 16. 
36 Childrens Court Annual Report 2013-2014, above n2, 2. 
37 Queensland Government, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee Report No. 58: Queensland Government 
response (2014) https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/committees/LACSC/2014/YouthJustice2014/gr-
18Mar2014.pdf.  
38 Commonwealth Government, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Wellbeing: A focus on children and youth, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4725.0Chapter110Apr%202011.  
39 Childrens Court Annual Report 2013-2014, above n2, 35. 
40 Ibid 4. 




oppressively and unjustly since Queensland has abolished the sentencing principle of 
‘detention as a last resort’. Since it is widely known that a high proportion of disadvantaged 
children come into contact with the juvenile justice system, it is in the community’s interest 
that the government enact more effective and targeted policies to tackle youth offending. 
Vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surrounds means that 
children have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative 
influences in their whole environment. It is hoped that the new Queensland Labor 
government will review these amendments as a matter of priority.42 
                                                            
42 A new Labor government took office in Queensland in February 2015. 
